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An Analysis of the Application of Club Good Models to Determine Carrying
Capacity of National Parks

The National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 requires that park managers develop and
implement a plan regarding visitor carrying capacity. In response, econometricians
have developed models that may be helpful to park management in regards to meeting
this goal. The focus of this paper is to highlight some of the earlier work done by
Buchanan (1965) and Ng (1973) in regards to modeling club goods and then to examine
more recent attempts by Turner (2000) and Prato (2001) in applying these models to help
determine carrying capacity of national parks. Turner (2000) and Prato’s (2001) models
will then be evaluated in regards to potential implementation proble ms.
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An Analysis of the Application of Club Good Models to Determine Carrying
C a p a c i t y
o f
N a t i o n a l
P a r k s
I. Introduction
The US National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 required that national parks
must be managed such that scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife are
conserved.

This act also mandated that the park managers should provide recreational

opportunity for visitors and non-impairment of resources (Prato, 2001). These two
important goals have been difficult to balance as national parks have experienced
increased visitors and thus higher levels of congestion.

Subsequently, the National

Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 required that park managers develop a plan to identify
and implement such a plan to address visitor carrying capacity (Prato, 2001).

II. Public v. Private Goods
Economists have struggled to find a satisfactory treatment for those goods which
do not fall neatly into one of the two categories of public (collective-consumption) and
private (individual-consumption) goods. While it may be more satisfying (in terms of
analysis) to distinguish between these two types of goods, in reality, a number of goods
fall between these two polar opposites.
Weisbrod (1964) points out that there is a significant number of private goods that
have characteristics of public goods.

Because the frequency of purchase of quasi-public

goods is uncertain and the associated costs of expanding production once services have
been reduced, Weisbrod (1964) felt that social welfare is benefited by subsidizing the
production of these goods.
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Using Sequoia National Park, Weisbrod (1964) first made the assumption that
even with admission fees it would be impossible to cover total costs.
lack of traditional external consumption or production factors.

This is due to the

Another hindrance is

that the commodity is not storable and therefore cannot be purchased and then used at a
later date. With total costs being greater than total revenue, Marshallian analysis would
dictate that the park be closed and that alternative uses for the park’s resources should be
found. Of course, this is only considering allocative efficiency and ignores social
welfare factors.

Ignored in this case are the people who are willing to pay for the option

to purchase this commodity (visit the park) in the future. This “option value” will have
little influence in the private market, however, because there is no practical mechanism
for calculating user fees.

Furthermore, if revenue is insufficient and the park is closed,

the option demand for future park usage will not be taken into account (Weisbrod, 1964,
473).
Weisbrod (1964) then considers the case where user fees are adequate to cover
total costs.

This means that “the option demand of persons who [are] not current

consumers would be satisfied at zero marginal cost (Weisbrod, 1964, 473).” That is to
say, so long as the park is in operation, the option exists as a pure public good. A pure
public good is defined as a good that can be consumed simultaneously without detracting
from the consumption opportunities for others.

This means that the park can then be

viewed as having an external economy with two outputs: service to users and stand-by
services to non-users.
The latter statement is difficult to quantify due to the fact that some of the “standby” users will not become actual users. Aside from considering the frequency of
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purchase, another consideration is the high costs of expansion or recommencement of
production in a short time frame. This, in fact, may be an impossible demand.
Consider the case where a large section of trees has been cut down.

In Sequoia National

Forest, it would take centuries for the forest area to be restored. This means that the
occasional user would find it difficult, if not impossible, to purchase the good.

In this

case, the costs associated with recommencement of production are too high (Weisbrod,
1964).
In their book The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Richard
Cornes and Todd Sanders (1996) outline four distinct characteristics of club goods. The
first characteristic is that an increase in membership size, and thus increased congestion,
will lead to an increase in both costs and benefits.

The additional costs are a result of

the now increased congestion and the benefits are the result of cost reductions that occur
due to the sharing of membership expenses.

This is in contrast to public goods, where

costs associated with increased membership will be zero.
a finite membership.

Second, club goods will have

Third, for club goods, nonmembers have the choice of joining

another club that offers the same club good, or they may choose not to join a club.
Fourth, toll fees require that there exist some exclusion mechanism that prevents
nonmembers from using the club good.

III. General Theory of Clubs
Buchanan (1965) developed a general theory of clubs in order to bridge the gap
between purely public and purely private goods.

In the case of pure private goods,

consumption by one individual automatically reduces the consumption level of another

Smith

6

individual. For pure public goods, however, there is non-rivalry in consumption of
goods and so goods may be used simultaneously with no effect on competing consumers.
While pure public goods can serve an infinite number of consumers and pure private
goods have only an individual consumer, the typical public good usually falls somewhere
between pure public and private goods and will have a finite number of consumers
greater than one. The central question then becomes, what is the optimal number of
consumers or the membership margin, otherwise defined as “the size of the most
desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement (Buchanan, 1965, 2).”
Using neo-classical models that consider the case of pure private consumption
only, the individual utility function is written,
(1)

U=U(X1,X2,…,Xn)

where each X represents the quantities of pure private goods available to each individual
during a specified time period.

This is then extended to include both pure public and

private goods,
(2)

U=U(X1,X2,…,Xn,Xn+1,Xn+2,…,Xn+m)

with Xn+1,Xn+2,…,Xn+m representing the quantity of pure public goods available to each
individual during a specified time period (Buchanan 1965).
With a non-pure good, however, an individual’s utility is a function of “the
number of other persons with whom he must share its benefits (Buchanan, 1965, 3).”
Sharing here means that the individual consumes a reduced quantity of the good.
Consider a group of i people sharing one hair cut per month. This means that each
person would receive 1/ith haircut per month. “Given any quantity of final good, as
defined in terms of the physical units of some standard quality, the utility that the

Smith

7

individual receives from this quantity will be related functionally to the number of others
with whom he shares (Buchanan, 1965, 3).”
The number of individuals who share the good, or club size, is disregarded in the
study of pure private goods because the optimal level is unity.

In the case of club

goods, however, the club size N will need to be included for each good.

The “club size

variable, N, therefore measures the number of persons who are to join in the
consumption-utilization arrangements for good X over the relevant time period
(Buchanan, 1965, 4).”
(3)

This produces the rewritten utility function,

U=U((X1,N1),(X2,N2),…,(Xn+m,Nn+m))

From here, it is possible to derive the marginal conditions for Pareto optimality.

First,

define the production function as,
(4)

F=F’((X1,N1),(X2,N2),…,(Xn+m,Nn+m))

The club-size is a necessary part of this function because a relationship exists between
club-size and cost and club-size and quantity purchased.

For example, a larger club-size

will usually result in lower collected fees. As a negative externality, however, this may
result in reduced quantity of service. A large golf club, for example, may mean it is
more difficult to schedule a tee time (Buchanan, 1965).
The production function makes it possible to derive equations for the necessary
marginal conditions for Pareto optimality with respect to consumption for two goods Xj
and Xr. Because the marginal rate of substitution for consumption is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution for production,
(5)

uj/ur=fj/fr

and by incorporating club-size, this can be written as,

Smith

(6)

8

uNj/ur=fNj/fr

This relationship says that equilibrium occurs when the marginal benefits of adding a
new member to the club are equal to the marginal cost of adding a member to the club.
We can then combine (5) and (6) to show,
(7)

uj/fj=ur/fr=uN/fN

When (7) is satisfied, the individual will have an optimal quantity of Xj and will be
“optimally” sharing this good over a finite group of individuals (Buchanan, 1965).

IV. Ng Model
Beginning with Buchanan’s equation (6), Ng (1973) believes that the
“conditions…obtained are the equilibrium conditions for an individual, given his market
opportunities and assuming he can choose his preferred Nj. [Therefore], for Pareto
optimality, we have to maximize the utility of an individual, subject to the constraints that
the level of utility of each other individual is held constant and that society’s production
possibilities are given (Ng, 1973, 291).”
Let there be s individuals, m collective goods, and (n-m) private goods modeled
by the following utility function for each ith individual
(N!)

U i  U i ( X 1 , N1 , Di1 ,...X m , N m , Dim , X mi 1 ,...X ni )

where Xj and Nj represent the quantity of and the number of individuals consuming the
jth collective good, X ij is the amount of the jth private good consumed by the ith
individual, and Dij=1 if individual i belongs to club j and 0 if not.

Divisibility in the

quantity of all goods and continuousness of Nj is also assumed (Ng, 1973).
The production function can then be written

Smith
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s

(N2)

F ( X 1 ,..., X m ,  X ni )  0
i 1

In order to derive the necessary conditions for Pareto optimality, Ui must be maximized
i

subject to the constraint U i  U (i  2,..., s) . Therefore, the Lagrangian function can be
written,
s

(N3)

L  U 1   i (U i  U )  F
i

i 2

By taking the partial derivatives respective to L the following equation are obtained:
s

(N4)

 U
i

i 1

(N5)

i
Xj

iU Xji  F
s

(N6)

 F

 U
i

i 1

i
Xj

0

( j  1,...,m)
( j  m  1,...,n; i  1,...,s)

( j  1,...,m)

Next, by combining equations N4, N5, and N6 and using Xn as a numeraire,
s

(N7)

U
i 1

i
Xj

i
U Xn
 FXj FXn

i
Xj

i
U Xn
0

s

(N8)

U
i 1

( j  1,...,m)

( j  1,...,m)

i
i
 U Nj
 0 for individuals not consuming Xj, equation N7 can
Utilizing the fact that U Xj

be written as
Nj

(N9)

U

i
Xj

i
U Xn
 FXj FXn

( j  1,...,m)

U

i
Xj

i
U Xn
 FXj FXn

( j  1,...,m)

i 1

(N9’)

isj

However, due to the fact that Nj is a discrete variable, it is more appropriate to use
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i
k
(U Njk U Xn
)  0 if i  Si ;
(N10) U ij   U Xn
k i

 0 if i  Si

which can be written in terms of the marginal rates of substitution,
(N10’)



Xj

0

i
i
k
k
(U Xj
U Xn
)dX j  U Xj
U Nn
 0 if i  S j ;
k i

 if i  S i

“This says that, for each collective good, any individual in the club must derive a total
benefit from the consumption of that good in excess of (or at least equal to) the aggregate
marginal disutility imposed on all other consumers in the club (Ng, 1973, 293).” The
reverse is also true for individuals not in the club.

Equation N9’ says that aggregate

marginal valuation equals the marginal cost (this is the Samuelson condition with the
exception that the set of consumers does not need to equal the set of individuals in
society, or Nj ≠ s. This differs from Buchanan’s analysis in that Buchanan’s equilibrium
equation (6) is no longer necessary for Pareto optimality. This is due to the fact that “Nj
enters into the utility function of a number of consumers simultaneously, and each
consumer cannot vary at Nj at will.

Hence the relevant condition for each Nj is the

aggregate marginal valuation rather than the individual marginal valuation (Ng, 1973,
293).”

V. Turner Model
Visitors making use of national parks enjoy a variety of activities, including:
hiking, biking, fishing, boating, swimming, cross-country skiing, horseback riding, and in
some parks snowmobiling. As the number of people making use of park services has
risen, park congestion has increased, diminishing user benefits.

This congestion creates

a situation where national parks are not purely public goods, but rather are club goods.
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Using Glacier National Park, Turner (2000) developed a hypothetical model for
managing multiple activities at a national park.

In particular, Turner’s model considers

entrance fees and other user fees (Turner, 2000).
Turner’s analysis employs a variable-utilization mixed-club model.

This method

was chosen because the club (national parks) consists of a group of members (park
visitors) who have diverse tastes and therefore will utilize the club differently.

In this

case, the “club is a single multiproduct club with unrestricted membership; the park is
unique, it offers more than one activity and admission to the park is open to all (though
there may be an entrance fee or other toll that some individuals choose not to pay)
(Turner, 2000, 475).”

In order to simplify the model, visitors are restricted to two

activities, or two goods (Turner, 2000).
Turner defines individual utility as a function of a numeraire good y, recreation V,
and wilderness W. Since wilderness is a public good, everyone consumes an equal
amount. Therefore, an individual’s utility can be written as U=U(y,V,W).

Recreational

benefits can be defined by the number of visits v and the index of enjoyment Φ.
Therefore, V=vΦ.

Now, let a1 and a2 be variables for the amount of time spent engaged

in each of the two activities.

Next, let qj represent the quality of the activity such that

for each individual the quality-adjusted amount of activity j engaged in for each
individual is represented by αj=ajqj. Therefore, Φ=Φ(α1,α2) represents the enjoyment
per visit derived for each individual (Turner, 2000).
Congestion, park size, and wilderness will affect visitor enjoyment, although to
what degree depends upon visitor preferences.

Therefore, quality decreases by γj for

each additional unit of congestion and quality increases in relation to the size of the park,
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Z, and wilderness area, W.

None the less, it should be recognized that an increase in

wilderness area can increase congestion. Thus, quality of activity j by for each
individual is given by q(γj,Z,W) (Turner, 2000).
Total congestion is a function of the total amount of each activity.

Therefore, if

A1=Σva1 and A2=Σva2, then γj(A1,A2,Z,W). Z and W are included because the larger the
size of the park or the larger the wilderness area, the less likely there will be congestion
cross-over effects that interfere with individual enjoyment of the park. Similarly,
wilderness can be defined as a function the two activities and park size, or W=W(A1,A2,Z)
(Turner, 2000).
Efficiency Conditions
The socially efficient allocation of resources can then by found by maximizing the
Benthamite social welfare function ΣU with respect to the resource constraint
E≥Σy+Στv+C(Z,A1,A2) where E is society’s endowment of the numeraire, τ is each
individual’s travel cost, and C(·) is the cost function for the park. Therefore, the
Lagrangian for the constrained optimization problem is:
(T1)

L= ΣU(y,V,W)+μ(E- Σy+Στv+C(Z,A1,A2))

Where V= vΦ(a1q1(γ1(A1,A2,Z,W),Z,W),a2q2(γ2(A1,A2,Z,W),Z,W)); Aj=Σvaj for j=1,2;
W=W(A1,A2,Z) and μ is the Lagrangian multiplier.

The park manager/planner then

chooses y, v, a1, and a2 for each individual and also chooses Z. First order conditions
can then be manipulated to yield,
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where MRS represents the marginal rate of substitution;
(T6)

 j    MRSVyv j a j

q j
 j

j  1,2

which represents the aggregate costs to visitors caused by marginal increases in
congestion due to activities 1 and 2; PW=ΣjMRSWy is a Samuelson summation of marginal
rates of substitution. PW measures the aggregate benefit to society of an increase in W.
εZ and εW show the effect of park size and wilderness on visitor enjoyment.

Expression

T5 is the provisional condition whereby the park’s size should by enlarged until marginal
social benefit is greater than marginal social cost.

Having a larger park is beneficial

because it decreases congestion, increases wilderness, and thus leads to potentially
greater rates of visitor enjoyment.

Expressions T2 thru T4, represent toll (user fee)

conditions (Turner, 2000).
Utility Maximization for Individuals
“An individual maximizes utility subject to the constraint that consumption of the
numeraire plus the cost of visitation, which includes travel costs as well as a park

Smith 14

entrance fee F and tolls t for each activity, must not exceed the individual’s endowment
of the numeraire E (Turner, 2000, 477).”
(T7)

The Lagrangian can be written,

L=U(y,vΦ(a1q1,a2q2),W+λ(E-y-(τ+F-t1a1-t2a2)v)

where variables y, v, a1, and a2 are choice variables and λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Assuming people do not consider congestion a deterrent to visiting the park yields a set
of first order conditions which can be manipulated to give,
(T8)

MRSVy= τ+F+t1a1+t2a2

(T9)

MRSVy  q1=t1 and
1

(T10) MRSVy  q2=t2
2

Interpretation of Toll Conditions
Using the individual’s optimization conditions T9 and T10, T3 and T4 implies
that the planner can influence individuals to make socially efficient choices by
implementing a toll equal to
(T11) t j  C A j  1

 1



 2 2 )a1  ( PW   W  1 1  2 2 )(W A a1 )
A j
A j1
W
W
j

j

where the first term is the partial derivative of the cost function with regard to each
activity, the second and third terms represent the increased tolls in response to an increase
in congestion due to increased consumers for activities 1 and 2, and the last term
represents the increase in tolls as a result of diminishing wilderness as a result of
increased congestion.

While the toll for each of the two activities should be different,

each individual should pay the same toll.
consume a greater amount (Turner, 2000).

Some individuals may pay more because they

Smith 15

These tolls should help to internalize two types of externalities. First, as
congestion increases, tolls will increase. Second, assuming the visitor activities reduce
wilderness levels, this will raise tolls.

Efficient activity tolls will mean that the resulting

efficient entrance fee, F, is zero (Turner, 2000).

VI. Prato Model
Conventional definitions of carrying capacity were defined by the “number of
visitors an area can sustain without degrading natural resources and visitor experiences
(Prato, 2001, 322).” New definitions of carrying capacity, however, define carrying
capacity as the “acceptability of natural resources and human impacts as measured by
selected biophysical resource and social conditions, rather than the number of visitors
(Prato, 2001, 321).” And while much progress has been made in determining carrying
capacity, much of the previous work has been non-quanitative, thus making it difficult for
park managers to provide quantitative proof that their park is meeting established
standards for biophysical and social carrying capacity (Prato, 2001).
Prato’s model consists of an ex post adaptive ecosystem management (AEM)
model and the ex ante multiple attribute scoring test of capacity (MASTEC) method.
The AEM model “determines whether the current state of an ecosystem is compliant with
biophysical and social carrying capacities…[by incorporating] adaptive management and
ecosystem management principles…[that are] implemented using Bayes’ rule (Prato,
2001, 322).” The MASTEC method “identifies the best management action for bringing
an incompliant ecosystem into compliance…[by utilizing] a stochastic multiple attribute
programming model (Prato, 2001, 322).”
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AEM Model
To begin, assume each unit of the National Park Service falls into one of four
categories after evaluating the unit’s compliance with policy concerning caring capacity:
M1, M2, M3, or M4, where M1 is highly compliant, M2 is moderately compliant, M3
moderately incompliant, and M4 is highly incompliant. The prior probabilities are then
p(M1), p(M2), p(M3), and p(M4) which sum to one. Next, let R1, R2, R3, and R4
represent the characteristics of a unit’s resource/social conditions.

For example, let the

percentage of native species and suitable endangered species habitats represent the
resource attribute and let the level of congestion and wait-time for public transportation
in the park be the social attribute. R1 in this case represents a significant loss in native
species, highly degraded endangered species habitats, high levels of congestion, and very
long wait-times for public transportation. R2 units will have moderate loss in native
species, moderately degraded endangered species habitats, moderately high levels of
congestion, and long wait-times for public transportation. R3 units will have most
native species present, good habitat areas for endangered species, low congestion, and
short wait-times for public transportation. R4 units have abundant native species,
excellent habitats for endangered species, very little congestion, and very short waittimes for public transportation (Prato, 2001).
The AEM model uses Bayes’ rule in order to minimize errors due to park
managers misidentifying the unit’s carrying capacity.
commonly occur.

There are two types of errors that

The first occurs when the park manager identifies a unit as being

compliant with carrying capacity conditions when it is not.

The second occurs when the

park manager decides the unit is incompliant with carrying capacity conditions because
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of resource/social conditions when the park is actually compliant with carrying capacity
conditions (Prato, 2001).
Using the AEM model, (Mi Rq) is the outcome of a unit’s carrying capacity and
resource/social condition where i=1,2,…I and q=1,2,…Q, thus resulting in IQ possible
outcomes.

“Prior probabilities of resource social condition Rq (outcomes are mutually

exclusive) is,
(P1)

p(Rq)=p(M1,Rq)+…+p(MI Rq)

where p(Mi Rq) is the joint probability of (Mi Rq) (Prato, 2001, 324).”

Bayes’ rule

defines the “probability that the ecosystem is in state M, given the condition Rq, is:
(P2)

p(Mi|Rq)=p(Mi Rq)/p(Rq)=[p(Rq|Mi)p(Mi)]/[Σp(Rq|Mi)p(Mi)]

where p(Mi|Rq) is the posterior probability, p(Rq|Mi) is the likelihood function for Rq,
p(Mi) is the prior probability of Mi, and Σp(Rq|Mi)p(Mi) is the expected value of the
likelihood function (Prato, 2001, 324).”
MASTEC Method
If the AEM model indicates that the unit is most likely R3 or R4, than there is no
need for the park manager to makes changes. However, if the AEM model indicates
that the unit is R1 or R2 the MASTEC method can be used to achieve a compliant
ecosystem state. “The MASTEC method is an ex ante procedure…[that helps] the
manager select the best management action for achieving compliance with carrying
capacities (Prato, 2001, 324).” The MASTEC method integrates the Limits of
Acceptable Change and Visitor Impact Management carrying capacity methods.

The

Limits of Acceptable Change method “requires a manager to identify where and to what
extent, changes in key biophysical and social processes are appropriate and acceptable,
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and to select a management action that is most likely to achieve conformance between
observed conditions and established standards (Prato, 2001, 324) .” A schematic of the
MASTEC method is given below in Figure 1 (Prato, 2001, 325),
Figure 1

Select
Alternative
Management
Actions

Choose
Attributes of
Management
Actions

Choose
Utility
Function
Determine
Attribute
Weights

Establish Carrying
Capacity Constraints
for all Attributes
Determine Attribute
Values for
Alternative
Management Actions

Select Best
Management Action

The best result for management will maximize the expected utility function
“E[U(z)] subject to the constraint z=a+e where z is a stochastic vector of attributes
provided by a management action, a is the deterministic component of z, which gives the
expected amounts of all attributes provided by the management action, and e is the
stochastic component of z, where E(e)=0 (Prato, 2001, 331).”
By solving the following chance-constrained mathematical programming
problem, management will find the best solution:
Maximize E[U(z*)]=
E[U(a*+e*)] subject to:Pr {b*j  b**
j } ≥1-αj for j=1,…,J, and
Pr {sk*  sk** } ≥1-βk for k=1,…,K
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where * indicates normalized attribute values.

This is done to reduce management

ranking bias created by differences in measurement units and to convert negative
attributes (attributes that are negatively related to utility) to positive attributes. Thus,
rather than less of an attribute increasing utility, more of an attribute increases utility.
The normalized attribute falls between [0,1].

The biophysical attributes b *j are at least

as great as the biophysical standard b**
with reliability 1-αj where 0< αj <1 for all j
j
biophysical attributes. Similarly, social attributes sk* are at least as great as the social
standards sk** with reliability 1-βk where 0< βk <1 for all K social attributes (Prato,
2001).
Specifying that E[U(z*)] is additive, meaning
E[U(z*)]= E[U1 ( z1* )]... E[UV ( z*J  K )] , implies that the marginal utilities of each of the
attributes are independent.

Assuming the manager is risk neutral, the expected utility

J

K

j 1

k 1

function is, E[U(z*)]=  w jb*jv   wk skv* where wj and wk are the weights for the jth
biophysical attribute and the kth social attribute, 0< wj <1, 0< wk <1, and
J

K

j 1

k 1

 w j   wk  1.

If the manager has constant risk aversion, then

J

K

j 1

k 1

E[U(z*)]=  w j [a j  c j 2j ]   wk [ak  ck  k2 ] ; and if the manager has variable risk
aversion and the utility subfunctions, Ui( zi* ), then
J

K

j 1

k 1

E[U(z*)]=  w j [U (a j )  c j 2j ]   wk [U (ak )  ck  k2 ] with expected values aj and ak,
variances  2j and  k2 , and positive scaling constants cj and ck (Prato, 2001).
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Using a multiple attribute decision-making framework to implement the
MASTEC method has the advantage of allowing more complex information concerning
management decisions to be collapsed into a single number, it permits stakeholders with
different attributes and/or values to rank and select management actions, it allows
managers to identify the best method for complying with carrying capacity standards, and
allows managers to evaluate the sensitivity of a management action to changes in
attribute weights and values (Prato, 2001).

VII. Analysis and Evaluation of the Four Models
The initial framework provided by Buchanan has served as a benchmark/point of
departure for each of the subsequent models.

Ng’s model is a modification of

Buchanan’s that utilizes aggregate consumer marginal valuation rather than individual
consumer marginal valuation. Turner makes the choice to rewrite Buchanon’s utility
function in terms of a Benthamite social welfare function using a numeraire good,
recreation, and wilderness area.

Turner then rewrites the constraint in terms of society’s

valuation of the numeraire, travel costs, and the cost function of the park.

In contrast,

while the previously mentioned authors make use of the Lagrange method to maximize
utility subject to a constraint, Prato takes a different route by employing the more
technology based MASTEC method.
While Buchanan’s and Ng’s models help to formulate a model for general club
goods, Turner and Prato’s models specifically focus on applications concerning national
parks. Because these models have yet to be implemented it is important that the models
are evaluated and their weaknesses addressed.
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Turner
Turner’s (2000) model has several implementation problems.

First, Turner’s

model uses εZ and εW to measure the impact of wilderness area and park size on visitor
enjoyment. The potential problem with this is that both of these measures are inelastic.
A park manager typically does not have the option of expanding the park when
congestion levels are high. Nor does the park manager have the ability to expand the
number of trees in a short time frame. This was one of the original arguments given by
Weisbrod (1964) concerning the difficulty in storing or quickly replacing lost resources.
Data collection is particularly difficult in regards to using Turner’s (2000) model
to estimate carrying capacity. Currently, the appropriate data are not being collected to
use this model. Turner’s model requires the collection of data concerning the levels of
congestion for various park activities and wilderness levels.

Data also needs to be

collected regarding park costs, visitor enjoyment, and public valuation of park services.
Further difficulties exist in regard to formulating an effective survey, which is often a
difficult and costly task that can result in biased conclusions.
Prato
While Prato’s (2001) model may be the most difficult to implement, it may also
prove to be the most useful.

The most difficult task is the development of a spatial

decision support tool. The development of this tool would provide numerous benefits to
park management. First, it would make it easier to acquire and analyze technical
information and public input.

Second, the public would become more informed about

the consequences of management decisions.

The development of this tool would

“enhance the manager’s and public’s understanding of how different attribute weights,
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attribute standards and reliability levels for achieving standards influence the selection of
the best management action (Prato 2001, 329).”

The development of this tool would

also provide an analytic method for determining park managers’ decisions.

Finally, this

tool would also help to alleviate conflict and create a database that would be useful for
soliciting other funding opportunities.
The aforementioned benefits of Prato’s model not withstanding, major
impediments to implementing Prato’s (2001) model include budgetary restrictions, a lack
of technical expertise, high turnover of park management, and the long time-frame
required to implement the AEM model, although some of the budgetary problems may be
overcome by soliciting grant money.

VIII. Concluding Remarks
A sizable weakness of each of the models is the assumption that it is possible to
exclude individuals who are not able and/or willing to be a part of the club.

This

includes both the direct violations as a result of visitors subverting park rules by making
use of the park’s services without paying a fee and more indirect violations.

For

example, non-users benefit from the maintenance of national park areas regardless of
whether they choose to make use of the park.

Some of these benefits include cleaner

air, higher property values, scenic vistas, and preservation of wildlife.

So long as the

possibility exists for park users to make use of park services without paying the
associated fees, there will be a percentage of consumers who will take advantage of the
situation. This problem is further compounded by the difficulty and expense incurred in
monitoring and fining these “free riders.”
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The ability to identify carrying capacity thresholds is also a difficult task for park
managers. An individual’s perception of environmental “damage” is often a subjective
measure and therefore makes identifying a threshold level of damage extremely difficult.
Some would measure this threshold as the point where damage becomes “noticeable” to
consumers. At this point, demand for the good falls sharply and so the manager might
see carrying capacity as a function of the number of visitors. This is not necessarily a
consistent value, however, due to the fact that increased education and better
management may lead to increased carrying capacity for the park (Davis, 2001).
Another concern is the transformation of national parks into a kind of
“amusement park.”
looks?

If activities fees are used, how will this change the way the park

How will it change consumers’ experiences?

Do we charge hikers for each

mile walked or do we restrict activity fees to activities such as tours, boating, etc.?
These are all issues that would need to be addressed by the park manager if user fees
were implemented.
Finally, any model incorporating a toll or user fee creates an ethical dilemma
regarding the exclusion of the poor from public property. When one considers that there
are few places for low-income families to enjoy recreational activities, some would argue
that charging fees potentially excludes low-income families from a public good.
Additionally, national parks are already subsidized by federal dollars that are the result of
taxation. This means that some individuals may be paying for a good they are unable to
use. This also raises a question regarding whether individual consumers of parks or all
individuals who pay taxes should be responsible for maintaining park facilities.
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Ultimately, a decision will need to be made in regard to the implementation of user fees;
is the goal to reduce subsidization, reduce congestion, or both?
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